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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Michael Anthony Hiatt appeals the denial of his Rule 35 motion, claiming 
that his proposed application of 2015 statutory amendments to a 2013 order 
revoking probation is not retroactive. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 The district court entered a judgment of conviction on the jury’s guilty 
verdict of felony domestic violence, sentencing Hiatt to five years with two years 
determinate and retaining jurisdiction on May 19, 2010.  (#40990 R., pp. 113-15.)  
The court later suspended execution of the sentence and placed Hiatt on 
probation for five years.  (#40990 R., pp. 121-23.)  Hiatt violated his probation 
three times, was reinstated on probation the first two times, but was ordered to 
serve his sentence on May 1, 2013.  (#40990 R., pp. 160-63, 231-33, 267-68.)  
The district court ordered Hiatt be given credit for 69 days served.  (#40990 R., 
p. 268.)  The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the revocation of probation and 
sentence.  State v. Hiatt, Docket No. 40990, 2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 393 
(Idaho App., March 25, 2014). 
 On August 8, 2013, while the case was on appeal, Hiatt moved for credit 
for time served.  (R., pp. 13-16.)  The district court granted the motion on August 
9, 2013, awarding credit for 548 days served.  (R., pp. 26-28.)  The district court 
specifically declined to grant credit for eight days served as a condition of 
probation.  (R., p. 27.)  This order was neither appealed from nor, apparently, 
challenged in the previously filed appeal.  See, generally, Hiatt, Slip Op. at p. 1. 
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 On January 27, 2016, Hiatt moved for credit for time served as a condition 
of probation, citing a 2015 amendment to I.C. § 18-309 providing that credit for 
time served as a condition of probation should be awarded.  (R., pp. 30-31, 33.)  
The district court denied the motion, holding that the 2015 statutory amendment 
to provide for credit to time served as a condition of probation did not apply 
retroactively to the 2013 order.  (R., pp. 41-43.)  Hiatt filed a timely notice of 
appeal.  (R., pp. 45-46.)   
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ISSUE 
 
 Hiatt states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Hiatt credit for time 
served as a condition of probation? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Hiatt failed to demonstrate that the 2015 amendments to I.C. §§ 18-
309 and 19-2603 applied to the revocation of his probation in 2013? 
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ARGUMENT 
 
The Amendments To I.C. §§ 18-309 And 19-2603 Do Not Apply Retroactively 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 The district court held that the 2015 amendment to I.C. § 18-309, which 
requires the award of credit for time served as a condition of probation, did not 
render illegal its 2013 award of credit for time served, which did not grant credit 
for discretionary time served as a condition of probation.  (R., pp. 41-43.)  On 
appeal Hiatt contends the district court erred because the sentence was illegal in 
2016, the time his motion for reconsideration was filed.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-
15.)  Hiatt’s argument is without merit because he is requesting an improper 
retroactive application of the statutory amendments. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 “The question of whether a sentencing court has properly awarded credit 
for time served to the facts of a particular case is a question of law, which is 
subject to free review by the appellate courts.”  State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67, 
68, 122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763, 
779 P.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1989)).  The appellate courts “defer to the trial court’s 
findings of fact, however, unless those findings are unsupported by substantial 
and competent evidence in the record and are therefore clearly erroneous.”  
State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 169, 170, 139 P.3d 771, 772 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing 
State v. Davis, 139 Idaho 731, 734, 85 P.3d 1130, 1133 (Ct. App. 2003)). 
 The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review.  State v. Thompson, 
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140 Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404, 
405, 94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 
C. The Legislature Did Not Make The Amendments To I.C. §§ 18-309 And 
19-2603 Retroactive 
 
 At the time the district court entered its order revoking probation and its 
order denying credit for time served as a condition of probation it was clearly 
established that a probationer was “not entitled to credit for the time he 
voluntarily surrendered to gain probation.”  State v. Banks, 121 Idaho 608, 610, 
826 P.2d 1320, 1322 (1992); see also State v. Jakoski, 132 Idaho 67, 68, 
96 P.2d 663, 664 (Ct. App. 1998) (citations omitted) (“The law in this area is well 
settled.  A period of incarceration that is a term and condition of probation will not 
be credited to a defendant whose probation is subsequently revoked.”).  Thus, 
the district court’s orders denying credit for time served as a condition of 
probation were entirely consistent with existing law when they were entered in 
2013. 
 Hiatt argues that the 2015 amendments1 to I.C. §§ 18-309 and 19-2603 
regarding credit for time served as a condition of probation should have been 
applied to his Rule 35 motion.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-14.)  This argument does 
not withstand analysis because such would require improper retroactive 
application of the statutory amendments. 
                                            
1 Three statutes, I.C. §§ 18-309, 19-2603, and 20-209A, were all amended in 
2015 H.B. 64 (2015 Idaho Sess. Laws, Chapter 99, pp. 240-41) to provide that 
credit for all pre- and post-judgment incarceration associated with a conviction 
would be awarded as time served in criminal cases.  I.C. § 19-2603 is specifically 
applicable to the award of credit for time served upon revocation of probation.   
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Idaho statutes are not to be applied retroactively “unless expressly so 
declared.”  I.C. § 73-101.  See also Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 937-38, 
318 P.3d 918, 927-28 (2014) (Idaho statutes are “not applied retroactively unless 
there is clear legislative intent to that effect.” (internal quotes omitted)).  Because 
there is no express legislative declaration of retroactivity in the credit for time 
served statutes, I.C. §§ 18-309 and 19-2603, as amended in 2015, “they do not 
have retroactive effect.”  State v. Leary, 160 Idaho 349, 352, 372 P.3d 404, 407 
(2016). 
 The relevant amendments became effective on July 1, 2015.  I.C. § 67-
510.  The district court entered its order denying credit for time served as a 
condition of probation on August 9, 2013.  (R., pp. 26-27.)  Because the 
amendments are not retroactive, they did not apply to the district court’s 
calculation of credit for time served.  Leary, 160 Idaho at 352-53, 372 P.3d at 
407-08. 
 Hiatt argues that because he asked for application of the statutory 
amendments at the time of his Rule 35 motion, he is not asking for retroactive 
application.  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 6-15.)  However, by definition his motion was 
one to “correct a court’s computation of credit for time served, granted pursuant 
to Idaho Code Sections 18-309 or 19-2603.”  I.C.R. 35(c).  Despite his 
protestations to the contrary, the order Hiatt wished to “correct” through his Rule 
35 motion was entered in 2013, and he therefore was, and is, seeking a 
retroactive application of the amendments. 
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Hiatt is requesting retroactive application of a statute despite the lack of 
any indication the legislature intended such retroactive application.  He has 
therefore failed to show error in the district court’s denial of his motion. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s order 
denying the Rule 35 motion. 
 DATED this 14th day of March, 2017. 
 
      _/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen______ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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